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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge: 
 
We are asked to decide if a state misdemeanor conviction 
for vehicular homicide is a "crime of violence" within the 
meaning of 18 U.S.C. S 16. Robert Francis was convicted of 
two counts of homicide by vehicle in Pennsylvania. 
Thereafter, the Immigration and Nationalization Service 
charged Francis with removability based upon its assertion 
that he had been convicted of an "aggravated felony" 
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). 8 
U.S.C. S 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 
The Immigration Judge ruled that homicide by vehicle as 
defined in Pennsylvania is not an "aggravated felony" under 
the INA, and the INS appealed to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals ("BIA"). The BIA disagreed. The Board ruled that 
homicide by vehicle is "a crime of violence" under S16, thus 
it is an "aggravated felony" under the INA, and thus Francis 
is removable. The Board therefore entered a final order of 
removal against Francis. This petition for review followed. 
For the reasons that follow, we will grant Francis' petition 
and remand to the BIA with instructions to vacate its order 
of removal. 
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I. Background Facts and Procedure 
 
Robert Francis is 67 years-old, has lived in the United 
States for over 25 years, and is married to a United States 
citizen. Administrative Record ("AR") at 102. However, 
Francis is a citizen of Jamaica. He entered the United 
States in 1975 as a "Nonimmigrant Visitor for Pleasure." In 
1987, he adjusted his immigration status to "Conditional 
Resident," a legal resident status. 
 
In May of 1993, Francis caused a tragic traffic accident 
wherein two people were killed on Interstate 95 in 
Philadelphia. He was thereafter convicted in state court of 
two counts of homicide by vehicle in violation of 18 Pa. 
C.S.A. S 3732.1 That statute defines homicide by vehicle, 
and categorizes it as a misdemeanor of the first degree. 
Francis was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of 
eighteen to sixty months in prison for the conviction. At the 
conclusion of that sentence, he was held on an INS 
detainer. The INS then initiated removal proceedings based 
upon its assertion that his state court conviction made him 
removable as an "aggravated felon" under the BIA. As noted 
above, the Immigration Judge terminated the proceedings 
in Francis' favor, but the INS reversed and ordered his 
removal. That order of removal is now before us based upon 




The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) divests this court of 
jurisdiction over a final order of removal against an alien 
convicted of certain delineated offenses. 8 U.S.C.  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 3732 provides: 
 
       Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person 
       while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or 
       municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle 
or 
       to the regulation of traffic except section 3731 (relating to 
driving 
       under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of 
       homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the 
       violation is the cause of death. 
 
18 Pa. C.S.A. 3732. 
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S 1252(a)(2)(C);2 Liang v. INS, 206 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2000). 
However, jurisdiction is only removed under the IIRIRA if 
"(1) the petitioner is an alien (2) who is deportable by 
reason of having been convicted of one of the enumerated 
offenses." Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2001).3 
Therefore, we must initially determine whether these two 
statutory prerequisites to the limitation of our jurisdiction 
are satisfied. Id. 
 
There is no dispute that Francis is an alien. Thus, the 
jurisdictional question that we must address is whether 
Francis' offense -- homicide by vehicle in violation of 18 Pa. 
C.S.A. S 3732 -- is "one of the enumerated offenses" under 
the IIRIRA. We hold that it is not. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) provides: 
 
(C) Orders against criminal aliens 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have 
jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is 
removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in 
section 1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) [entitled "Aggravated felony"], 
(B), 
(C), or (D) of this title, or any offense covered by section 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) 
of this title for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to 
their 
date of commission, otherwise covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this 
title. 
 
3. We recognize that the Supreme Court has recently held that certain 
provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, including 8 U.S.C.A. S 1252(a)(2)(C), do not deprive 
district courts of jurisdiction to review a resident alien's habeas corpus 
petition challenging a BIA decision. INS v. Cyr , ___ S.Ct. ___, 2001 WL 
703922 *11 (U.S. June 25, 2001). That is in accord with our decision in 
Liang v. INS, 206 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2000). We pause here merely to note 
that the Supreme Court expressly decided not to address the 
jurisdictional question of whether a court of appeals has jurisdiction to 
determine whether the S 1252(a)(2)(C) jurisdictional bar applies to 
petitions for review of BIA decisions, i.e. whether an alien has been 
convicted of an aggravated felony. Calcano-Martinez v. INS, ___ U.S. ___, 
2001 WL 703943 *1 n.2 (U.S. June 25, 2001) (explaining that the 
government conceded that courts of appeals have jurisdiction to 
determine the jurisdictional facts of "whether an individual is an alien 
and whether he or she has been convicted of an `aggravated felony' " but 
that the petitions there did not raise this issue). 
 





8 U.S.C. S 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) states that any alien convicted 
of an "aggravated felony" is deportable. 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(F) defines "aggravated felony" under the INA to 
include any "crime of violence." The INA does not directly 
define "crime of violence." Instead, it incorporates the 
definitions set forth in the Crimes Code at 18 U.S.C. S 16. 
See 8 U.S.C. S 1101 (43)(F).4 "Crime of violence" is defined 
therein as: 
 
       (a) an offense that has as an element the use, 
       attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
       against the person or property of another, or 
 
       (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its 
       nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 
       against the person or property of another may be used 
       in the course of committing the offense. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 16. The BIA concluded that subsection (a) is not 
applicable to Francis' state conviction, but held that his 
offense fell within the confines of subsection (b). We agree 
that Francis' state conviction does not fall underS 16(a). 
However, we disagree with the BIA's conclusion that it is 
included under S 16(b). 
 
In order for a conviction to be a "crime of violence" under 
subsection (b), the offense must first be a "felony;" and 
second, it must be an offense that "by its nature, involves 
a substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. S 16(b). 
 
Francis argues that vehicular homicide under 
Pennsylvania law fails to meet either requirement. He 
argues that the offense is a misdemeanor under 
Pennsylvania law and therefore cannot qualify as a felony 
for purposes of the INA. He also argues that it is not an 
offense that "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 
physical force against the person or property of another 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. 8 U.S.C. S 1101(43) states that "aggravated felony" includes . . . (F) 
a 
crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, . . .) For which 
the 
term of imprisonment [is] at least one year." 
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may be used in the course of committing the offense." 18 
U.S.C. S 16(b). Finally, Francis argues thatS 16(b) requires 
specific intent and that homicide by vehicle involves a 
much lower level of culpability under Pennsylvania law. 
 
A. Whether A Misdemeanor Can Be A Felony 
Under S 16(b) 
 
Francis claims that inasmuch as he was convicted of a 
misdemeanor under Pennsylvania law, he is not a felon; 
"much less an `aggravated' one." Francis Br. at 6. In United 
States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1999), we held 
that a crime can be regarded as an aggravated felony even 
if it is categorized as a misdemeanor. There, Graham pled 
guilty to illegally reentering this country following 
deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1326. At sentencing, 
an issue arose as to whether he should be classified as an 
aggravated felon under U.S.S.G. S 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). A 
defendant who is classified as an aggravated felon faces a 
sixteen-level increase in his/her offense level under the 
Sentencing Guidelines.5 The district court sentenced 
Graham as an aggravated felon based upon the court's 
conclusion that his prior state misdemeanor conviction for 
petit larceny qualified as an aggravated felony even though 
the state where he committed the offense defined it as a 
misdemeanor. "The aggravated felony classification changed 
Graham's guideline sentence range from 21-27 months to 
70-87 months." 169 F.3d at 788. 
 
On appeal, we framed the issue as follows: 
 
       whether a misdemeanor can be an "aggravated felony" 
       under a provision of federal law even if it is not, 
       technically speaking a felony at all. The particular 
       question is whether petit larceny, a class A 
       misdemeanor under New York law that carries a 
       maximum sentence of one year, can subject a federal 
       defendant to the extreme sanctions imposed by the 
       "aggravated felon" classification [contained in 8 U.S.C. 
       S 1101(a)(43)]. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. U.S.S.G. S 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) incorporates the aggravated felony 
definitions 
used in 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43). 
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Id., at 788. We answered in the affirmative. In resolving the 
issue, we focused on an amendment to S 1101(a)(43)(G), 
which lowered the imprisonment threshold from five years 
to one year. We explained that felonies had historically 
been defined as those crimes that are punishable by at 
least a year in prison. Those offenses punishable by less 
time in prison had historically been defined as 
misdemeanors. However, we concluded that the term 
"aggravated felony" is a term of art which can include 
"certain misdemeanants who receive a sentence of one 
year," id. at 792, even though the underlying crime has 
been labeled a "misdemeanor" under state law. 
 
Our analysis in Graham does not, however, answer the 
question presented here. Graham was an aggravated felon 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(G). That subsection 
specifically defined theft crimes as aggravated"felonies" so 
long as "the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year." Id. 
at 789.6 Graham had clearly been convicted of a state theft 
offense, and that offense, though categorized by New York 
as a Class A misdemeanor, had "a maximum of a year's 
imprisonment under New York law." Id. at 789. That is all 
subsection (43)(G) required. Francis is charged with an 
aggravated felony under subsection (43)(F). As stated above, 
that provision of the INA requires a "crime of violence" 
under 18 U.S.C. S 16. We must therefore determine if 
S 16(b), which specifically refers only to"felonies," includes 
offenses that have been categorized as "misdemeanors" by 
the state that has defined the underlying conduct as 
criminal. Thus, although Graham may be instructive, it 
does not control our determination of Congress' intent in 
adopting 18 U.S.C. S 16. 
 
The BIA concluded that it is irrelevant that Pennsylvania 
labels the offense as a misdemeanor. The BIA used the 
federal default definition of felony found in 18 U.S.C. 
S 3559 to conclude that, irrespective of the state 
classification, Francis' conviction was a felony under federal 
law. 18 U.S.C. S 3559 defines "felony" as an offense that is 
not otherwise classified where "the maximum term of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We concluded that the verb "is" was inadvertently omitted from the 
text of the statute. 
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imprisonment authorized is . . . less than five years but 
more than one year."7 The BIA reasoned "it is both fair and 
logical to rely on the federal statutory definition of `felony' 
when that term appears in a federal statute that is 
applicable in the respondent's case." AR at 4. 
 
The government argues that the BIA's analysis is entitled 
to deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron : 
 
       [w]hen a court reviews an agency's construction of the 
       statute which it administers, it is confronted with two 
       questions. [1] First, always, is the question whether 
       Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
       issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
       of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
       must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 
       of Congress. [2] If, however, the court determines 
       Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
       question at issue, the court does not simply impose its 
       own construction on the statute, as would be 
       necessary in the absence of an administrative 
       interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
       ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
       question for the court is whether the agency's answer 
       is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
 
Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (emphasis added). 
However, in Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225,239 (3d Cir. 
1999) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. S 3559 provides: 
 
       (a) Classification.--An offense that is not specifically classified 
by a 
       letter grade in the section defining it, is classified if the 
maximum 
       term of imprisonment authorized is-- 
 
       *** 
       *** 
       *** 
       *** 
 
        (5) less than five years but more than one year, as a Class E 
       felony. . . 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3559(a)(5) (emphasis added). 
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(1987)), we noted that pure questions of statutory 
construction must be resolved by courts. There, we 
explained that Chevron deference will only apply to an 
inquiry "that implicates agency expertise in a meaningful 
way." Id. More recently, in Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d at 
247, we intimated that Chevron deference might not apply 
in the context of defining "forgery" within the meaning of 8 
U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(R), because the BIA did not utilize any 
specific expertise in interpreting that provision of the INA. 
Federal courts regularly interpret such terms. Id. at 247. 
 
Clearly, the BIA did not rely upon any expertise in 
interpreting the meaning of "felony" within 18 U.S.C. S 16; 
a general criminal statute. Moreover, Chevron  instructs that 
we accord deference only to the BIA's "construction of the 
statute which it administers." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
The BIA is not charged with administering 18 U.S.C.S 16, 
and that statute is not transformed into an immigration law 
merely because it is incorporated into the INA by 
S 1101(43)(F). We therefore conclude that the BIA's 
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. S 16 is not entitled to deference 
under Chevron.8 
 
Congress did not use the term "felony" inS 16(a). Rather, 
S 16(a) is narrowly drawn to include only crimes whose 
elements require the "use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force." Although S 16(b) is  specifically limited to 
felonies, it does not include all felonies. It is limited to those 
felonies that "by [their] nature involve[s] a substantial risk 
that . . . force . . . may be used." Clearly, Congress intended 
to include felonies and misdemeanors under subsection (a), 
but only intended certain felonies to be included under 
subsection (b). The Senate Report for the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984 makes this clear. 
 
       The term `crime of violence' is defined, for purposes of 
       all of Title 18 U.S.C. in Section 1001 of the Bill (the 
       first section of Part A of Title X) . . . The term means 
       an offense -- either a felony or a misdemeanor  -- that 
       has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Moreover, for the reasons we set forth below, we would reverse the 
decision of the BIA even if Chevron applied because the BIA's analysis is 
not a reasonable interpretation of 8 U.S.C. S 1101(43)(F). 
 
                                9 
 
 
       threatened use of physical force against the person or 
       property of another, or any felony that, by its nature, 
       involves the substantial risk that physical force against 
       person or property may be used in the course of its 
       commission. 
 
S.Rep. No. 225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 
(emphasis added). Congress was obviously aware that the 
definition of a "felony" varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, and it could certainly have defined an 
"aggravated felony" under the INA to include any state 
offense that would be classified as a felony under federal 
law. It did not do so. 
 
Francis' crime is only arguably a felony because of the 
application of 18 U.S.C. S 3559. However,S 3559 was 
intended as a last resort that would be employed only if 
"[a]n offense that is not specifically classified . . . in the 
section defining it, [provides for a] maximum term of 
imprisonment [of] less than five years but more than one 
year." Such crimes are, by default, categorized under 
federal law as Class E felonies. 18 U.S.C. S 3559(a)(5) 
(emphasis added). In United States v. Donley, we explained 
that: 
 
       Title 18 U.S.C. S 3559 assigns letter grades to offenses 
       that previously had none on the basis of the maximum 
       terms of imprisonment authorized by statutes describing 
       the offenses. One letter grade comprises offenses that 
       carry different statutory penalties in the underlying 
       statutes describing them. For example, first and 
       second degree murder are both classified as Class A 
       felonies under S 3559. 
 
878 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). 
Labeling a particular offense as a misdemeanor should end 
the matter for the purposes of S 16(b). After all, Francis did 
not violate federal law, he violated state law. C.f. Doe v. 
Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339, 1343 (8th Cir. 1998) (explaining in 
the context of the Violence Against Women Act 42 U.S.C. 
SS 13981-14040, that a state misdemeanor is not a crime of 
violence within the meaning of S 16 (b) because "we cannot 
simply borrow the federal classification of a felony and 
apply it to conduct that could not constitute a crime under 
federal law.") 
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At oral argument, the INS contended that the adoption of 
the federal definition for the term "felony" provides a 
"federal objective standard" in treating all resident aliens 
alike regardless of the states classification of the crime. The 
INS argued that another state could charge the very same 
conduct as a felony, and therefore, adopting a federal 
classification affords equal treatment to all petitioners 
regardless of the place of conviction. We reject this policy 
argument for several reasons. First, as we have already 
explained, S 16(a) includes misdemeanors and felonies. 
Under S 16(a), similar conduct is included in the definition 
of "aggravated felony" regardless of the state's label. 
 
Moreover, the government's argument for uniformity 
ignores that maximum penalties will also vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See The Unconstitutionality of 
Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of "Aggravated 
Felony" Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1696,1725-29 (1999). 
Therefore, relying upon the maximum penalty prescribed by 
a given state to determine if an offense is a felony using 
S 3559 does not eliminate nonuniform treatment of 
offenders from state to state. The disparity merely shifts to 
the differing maximum sentences prescribed, rather than a 
state's classification. 
 
In addition, the INS' "equality" argument fails to give 
effect to the language of S 1101(a)(43)(F). Section 
1101(a)(43)(F) defines aggravated felony as a "crime of 
violence [ ] as defined in section 16 of Title 18 for which the 
term of imprisonment [is] at least one year." 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(F) (emphasis added). It would create a 
redundancy to define "felony" in S 16(b) as an offense 
involving "a substantial risk of force" for which the 
maximum sentence is more than one year, see 18 U.S.C. 
S 3559(a)(5), when S 1101(a)(43)(F) already defines an 
aggravated felony to include "crime[s] of violence as defined 
in section 16 Title 18 for which the term of imprisonment 
[is] at least one year.9  Section 1101(a)(43)(F) has already 
captured those offenses. In this context, we think it is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In 1996, Congress amended S 1101(a)(43)(F),(G),(N), and (P), by 
lowering the maximum penalty threshold from at least five years to at 
least one year. 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-627. 
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incongruous to read "felony" in S 16(b) as being defined by 
the applicable term of imprisonment set by the underlying 
state offense. The Board is already applying a "federal 
objective standard" to all resident aliens, one that has been 
expressly dictated by Congress' use of the words"for which 
the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year." Since this 
phrase already includes or excludes aliens based on the 
length of the sentence, we see no reason why we should 
read the term "felony" in Section 16(b) as contingent upon 
the term of imprisonment rather than a state's 
categorization. 
 
Reading the statute without importing the default 
classifications in 18 U.S.C. S 3559 eliminates this 
redundancy. If a state has categorized an offense as a 
misdemeanor or a felony, subsection (a) will define the 
offense as an "aggravated felony" if the elements include the 
"use, attempted use, or threatened use of . . . force." 18 
U.S.C. S 16(a). Certain offenses categorized as felonies 
under state law, having a maximum of at least one year, as 
required by 8 U.S.C. S 1101 (43) (F), are also"aggravated 
felonies." This captures those instances where a state may 
define felonies to include offenses that have a shorter 
maximum than one year imprisonment. However, where as 
here, the offense is categorized as a misdemeanor under 
state law, it is excluded unless it involves force and falls 
under subsection 16(a). Thus, by relying upon state law to 
provide the categorization, we eliminate the redundancy 
that would otherwise result from including both a 
maximum of one year imprisonment under S 1101(43)(F) 
and the condition precedent of "felony" inS 16(b) that is 
expressly incorporated into S 1101(43)(F). 10 
 
This interpretation is also consistent with the rule of 
lenity as embodied in "the longstanding principle of 
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes 
in favor of the alien." INS v. Cyr, ___ U.S. ___, 2001 WL 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Our approach of using the state label is consistent with United States 
v. Villanueva-Gaxiola, 119 F. Supp.2d 1185,1190 (Dist. Kansas 2000) 
(finding that "[b]ecause California Penal Code S 12020 encompasses 
misdemeanor offenses, it cannot meet the definition of `crime of violence' 
in 18 U.S.C. S 16(b)."). 
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703922 *14 (U.S. June 25, 2001) (quoting INS v. Cardoza- 
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 42, 449 (1987)).11  This is no small 
consideration given the changes in immigration law 
effectuated by the IIRIRA. For all the reasons set forth 
above, we conclude that Francis' state court conviction was 
not an "aggravated felony" under the INA. 
 
B. Whether Homicide By Vehicle Can Otherwise 
Fall Under S (16(b) 
 
Moreover, even if we assume arguendo that Francis' 
misdemeanor conviction of vehicular homicide can 
somehow be converted into a felony for S 16(b) purposes, we 
would still conclude that his conviction is not an 
"aggravated felony." As noted above, S 16(b) also requires 
that he be convicted of a crime that, "by its nature, involves 
a substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. S 16(b). Homicide by 
vehicle in Pennsylvania is not such an offense. 
 
A brief review of the procedural history places our 
discussion in its proper context. Francis was convicted of 
two counts of homicide by vehicle following a trial, and he 
appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. He argued 
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
sustain a conviction. The Superior Court rejected this 
argument. Commonwealth v. Francis, 665 A.2d 821,823 (Pa. 
Super. 1995). In doing so, the court held that Francis was 




11. We are aware that we refused to apply the rule of lenity in Graham, 
however, as we note in our discussion of Graham , supra, there was no 
ambiguity in the text we were interpreting there. As is evident from our 
discussion, the same can not be said of the statutes at issue here. 
Moreover, we expressly allowed for the rule of lenity in Steele v. 
Blackman, 236 F3d 130, (3rd Cir. 2001) ("Since the distribution of 
marijuana . . . is not inherently a felony, it seems to us that the only 
alternative to so regarding it consistent with the rule of lenity would be 
to treat any S 844 offense in this context as a misdemeanor.") (emphasis 
added). 
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       The Commonwealth established beyond a reasonable 
       doubt that appellant violated S75 Pa.C.S. 4903, which 
       prohibits any backing up on a limited access highway 
       such as I-95. The Commonwealth also proved beyond 
       a reasonable doubt, through expert and eyewitness 
       testimony, that appellant's act of backing up his 
       vehicle into traffic directly caused Mr. Rutter to lose 
       control of his vehicle, which precipitated the multiple 
       vehicle accident in which the Rutters were killed. 
       Finally, we find that appellant's conduct was criminally 
       negligent, as the backing up of a vehicle into oncoming 
       traffic traveling 55 miles per hour is a gross deviation 
       from the standard of care observed by a reasonable 
       person. See Heck, 517 Pa. at 201, 535 A.2d at 580 
       (criminal negligence requires gross deviation from 
       standard of care reasonable person would observe); In 
       the Interest of Hyduke, 371 Pa.Super. 380, 388, 538 
       A.2d 66, 70 (1988) (criminal negligence established 
       where appellant drove 85 miles per hour, lost control of 
       his vehicle, and crossed the center line); Cheatham, 
       419 Pa.Super. at 611-12, 615 A.2d at 806-07 (epileptic 
       was criminally negligent for driving while knowing he 
       was subject to seizures). Accordingly, we find that 
       appellant's sufficiency claim has no merit. 
 
Id. at 823-24. 
 
Under Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990), 
we use the "categorical approach" to determine if Francis' 
conviction for vehicular homicide comes within the meaning 
of the second part of S 16(b). Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 
246, 249 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575, 600 (1990) and In re Alcantar, 20 I.&N.Dec. 801, 
809 (B.I.A. 1994)). Therefore, we must look to 
Pennsylvania's definition of homicide by vehicle. As noted 
previously, 18 Pa. C.S.A. S 3732 provides: 
 
       Any person who unintentionally causes the death of 
       another person while engaged in the violation of any 
       law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance 
       applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the 
       regulation of traffic except section 3731 (relating to 
       driving under influence of alcohol or controlled 
       substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a 
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       misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is 
       the cause of death. 
 
18 Pa. C.S.A. S 3732. On its face, homicide by vehicle is 
certainly not an offense that "by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. S 16(b). The BIA 
acknowledged that S 3732 involves a range of behavior that 
"may or may not" fall under S 16(b). 
 
The categorical approach does "permit the sentencing 
court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow 
range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all 
the elements of [the relevant] generic [offense]." Taylor, 495 
U.S. at 602. Here, the criminal complaint stated: 
 
       Southbound on Route 95 in the vicinity of Comly Street 
       the defendant unintentionally caused the death of the 
       decedent #1 Harry B. Rutter, Driver of vehicle #1, by 
       operating a 1985 Chevrolet Caprice, Pa. License ADB 
       7268, while his operating privilege was suspended, and 
       in such a manner as to cause a eight vehicle accident 
       between four cars, one van, and three tractor trailers 
       and a near miss by a tanker truck carrying 8000 
       gallons of gasoline, causing the deaths of two people 
       and injuring a third. 
 
AR at 110 (emphasis added). 
 
Francis was therefore charged with the "unintentional" 
conduct, of operating an automobile in such a manner as 
to cause a car accident resulting in two deaths. The phrase 
"while his operating privilege was suspended" is the 
attendant circumstance that furnishes the violation of law 
that is the condition precedent to criminal culpability. The 
BIA, however, reviewed the criminal complaint and found 
that driving with a suspended license, could "in and of 
itself, present a `substantial risk' that physical force would 
be used against the person or property of another." Id. at 6. 
Relying on United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 
217, 219 (5th Cir. 1999) and Matter of Magallanes, Interim 
Decision 3341 at 6-7 (BIA 1998), the BIA reasoned that "a 
motor vehicle in the wrong hands has enormous potential 
to cause damage to the vehicle and other property, as well 
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as personal injuries and death to innocent people." AR at 6. 
Further, the BIA reasoned that "the precise risk created by 
[Francis'] conduct was actually realized in the present case 
with devastating consequences." AR at 6-7. However, 
nothing on this record establishes that driving with a 
suspended license, in and of itself, involves a substantial 
risk of physical force. 
 
There are undoubtedly many reasons why a state would 
suspend a person's driving privileges, some of which may 
have no relation to a person's fitness to drive or the 
likelihood that he or she will use physical force. See 
Commonwealth Dept of Transportation v. Empfield, 526 Pa. 
220 (1991) (setting forth numerous infractions of the 
Pennsylvania Vehicle Code that justify suspension of a 
driver's license including the ministerial act of failing to 
renew a valid license). Moreover, we find both Galvan- 
Rodriguez and Matter of Magallanes distinguishable. 
 
Galvan-Rodriguez involved the state offense of 
unauthorized use of an automobile; a crime that is similar 
to car theft with all of the attendant dangers of high speed 
chases, speeding, and recklessness endemic in car theft. 
Clearly, one who steals a car will be far more likely to 
operate it recklessly than the car's owner. Matter of 
Magallanes involved the state offense of aggravated driving 
under the influence. The dangers of operating an 
automobile while one's faculties are impaired by drugs or 
alcohol are all too obvious, and too common to require 
further elaboration. Significantly, homicide by vehicle is 
specifically defined to exclude the traffic violation of driving 
under the influence under 18 Pa. C.S.A. S 3731. Homicide 
by vehicle, as the Superior Court noted in affirming Francis' 
conviction, arises from criminally negligent behavior. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Heck 517 Pa. at 201, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that ordinary negligence 
is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of homicide by 
vehicle under 18 Pa.C.S.A. S 3732. 535 A.2d 575,579 (Pa. 
1987). The court found that the government must establish 
recklessness or criminal negligence. Id. In Pennsylvania, 
criminal negligence is defined as follows: 
 
       A person acts negligently with respect to a material 
       element of an offense when he should be aware of  a 
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       substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material 
       element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk 
       must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's 
       failure to perceive it, considering the nature and intent 
       of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, 
       involves a gross deviation from the standard of care 
       that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's 
       situation. 
 
Heck, 517 Pa. at 201 (citing 18 Pa. C.S 302(b)(4)) (emphasis 
added). In contrast, Pennsylvania defines reckless conduct 
as follows: 
 
       A person acts recklessly with respect to a material 
       element of an offense when he consciously disregards a 
       substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material 
       element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk 
       must be of such a nature and degree that, considering 
       the nature and intent of the actor's conduct and the 
       circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a 
       gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
       reasonable person would observe in the actor's 
       situation. 
 
18 Pa. C.S.A. S 302(b)(3) (emphasis added). The BIA 
determined that Francis' conduct was reckless. It may well 
have been. However, recklessness was not charged, and he 
was not convicted of an offense requiring that mens rea. 
The criminal complaint alleges only that Francis 
unintentionally caused the death of two persons by driving 
a car "while his operating privilege was suspended, and in 
such a manner as to cause a eight vehicle accident .. ." 
The complaint expressly uses the term "unintentional[ ]." It 
did not charge him with recklessness. Given the criminal 
complaint, and the Superior Court's opinion, it was error 
for the BIA to conclude that Francis was convicted of 
recklessness. He was convicted of criminal negligence. 
 
The BIA also discussed our decision in United States v. 
Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992). The BIA believed that 
Parson supports the conclusion that homicide by vehicle 
falls under 18 U.S.C. S 16(b) because Francis was willing to 
"engage in conduct that carries enormous potential risk 
that physical force will be used against persons or 
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property." AR at 7. However, in Parsons, we interpreted a 
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines that is distinguished 
from S 16(b) despite similar wording. The relevant provision 
of the Guidelines at issue in Parsons was U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.2(1); the Career Offender provision. In deciding that 
Parsons was a career offender we noted that U.S.S.G. 
S 4b1.2(ii) included within the definition of"crime of 
violence" any offense that "involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 
(Emphasis added). Id. at 867. Thus, to the extent that the 
discussion there has any relevance to our inquiry here at 
all, we note our focus there was on conduct. Here, S 16(b) 
requires that we focus upon the nature of the underlying 
felony rather than the conduct that caused Francis to be 
convicted of the felony. Parsons had been convicted of 
"recklessly endangering" others under state law. We cannot 
conclude that Francis' crime, involving criminal negligence, 
so strongly implicates the use of force or risk of force as to 
sweep Francis' conviction within "crime of violence" here. 
 
Parson's state conviction satisfied the requirement for a 
career offender because he pled guilty to, and was 
convicted of, " `conduct that presents a serious risk of 
physical injury to another' " under Delaware law. Id. at 872 
(emphasis added). Though Francis' conduct may well have 
also posed such a risk, the statute he was convicted under 
does not, by its nature, require it.12  Any level of negligence 
poses a risk of some kind of injury. However, as noted 
above, driving while one's license is suspended simply does 
not bear a sufficient risk of physical injury to allow us to 
conclude that the nature of Francis' offense satisfies 
S 16(b). See United States v. Galo, 239 F.3d 572, 577 (3rd 
Cir. 2000) ("Under the `categorical approach' the sentencing 
court can look only to the fact of conviction and the 
statutory definition of the prior offense. The court's analysis 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Significantly, to the extent that his level of criminal "negligence" 
was 
so reckless as to be wanton or constitute malice, he could have been 
charged with third degree murder. See Commonwealth v. Marcelette 
Miller, 627 A.2d 741 (Pa. Super. 1993). That would have been the kind 
of offense that, "by its nature" involves the use or substantial risk that 
force will be used. 
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is not controlled by the conduct giving rise to the 
conviction.") (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-602.). 
 
After considering the text of S 3732, the criminal 
complaint, and Pennsylvania precedent together with our 
own, we find that Francis' conviction for vehicular homicide 
is not an offense that "by its nature, involves a substantial 
risk that physical force against the person or property of 
another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense." 18 U.S.C. S 16(b). 
 
We do not for a moment minimize the tragic 
consequences of Francis' conduct nor the loss that he 
caused the families of the two people killed by his 
negligence. However, the tragic nature of the accident he 
caused does not mean that he was convicted for a crime 
that, "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 




For the reasons set forth above, we hold that Francis has 
not committed a "crime of violence" that is a predicate for 
"aggravated felony" status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
SS 1101(a)(43)(F). Therefore, we have jurisdiction over this 
petition as Francis is not "removable by reason of having 
committed a criminal offense covered in section . . . 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)," which refers to an alien who is convicted 
of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). 
Inasmuch as Francis had not been convicted of an 
"aggravated felony" he was not removable as charged by the 
INS. Accordingly, Francis' petition for review is granted and 
we will remand to the BIA with instructions to vacate its 
order of removal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. 18 Pa. C.S.A. S 302(4)(d) provides: 
 
       Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all material 
elements. 
       --When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of 
culpability 
       that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without 
       distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision 
       shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a 
       contrary purpose plainly appears. 
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